Ghana’s Border Intelligence Brief: New Smuggling Route Tied to Sahel Jihadists

In early 2025, a previously undetected smuggling corridor was exposed, traversing Ghana’s Upper East and North East regions. Intelligence gathered from multiple sources—including ground patrols, drone surveillance, border interviews, and intercepted communications—confirms the route originates from jihadist-occupied zones in eastern Burkina Faso. The route is now considered a vital logistics and recruitment artery for Sahel-based extremist factions, notably ISIS-Greater Sahara (ISGS), Ansarul Islam, and elements of Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM).

Smuggling convoys comprising modified motorcycles, donkey carts, and vehicles carrying hidden caches of arms, cash, propaganda materials, and mobile communication devices are frequently disguised as cross-border traders or herders. Several operatives arrested between 2023 and 2025 have confessed to receiving direct instructions from recruiters in Fada N’Gourma and Djibo, Burkina Faso. Intelligence indicates a growing sophistication in how militants camouflage their movements—leveraging tribal familiarity, market networks, and porous forest paths.

“The threat is not coming—it is already crossing. Ghana’s northern frontiers are no longer buffer zones but operational gateways. If our intelligence fails to adapt, the terrorists will not knock—they will walk in.” — Emmanuel Kotin, Executive Director, Africa Center for Counter Terrorism

Satellite: Footpaths near Ghana–Burkina Faso border

The aftermath of military takeovers in Mali (2021), Burkina Faso (2022), and Niger (2023) has fractured national counterinsurgency frameworks, creating a security vacuum that jihadist groups have exploited to shift operations southward. As international forces such as the French-led Barkhane Mission and MINUSMA (Mali) drew down, Ghana—known for its relative internal stability—has become a target for cross-border expansion. Its strategic position and minimal armed conflict history render it vulnerable to infiltration from collapsing northern neighbors.

Many of Ghana’s northern border communities share kinship ties with populations in Burkina Faso and Togo. These transnational linkages—especially among Fulani, Mossi, and Mamprusi ethnic groups—provide natural cover for infiltrators. Ghana’s border control units, although diligent, face capacity constraints in manpower, technology, and tactical intelligence integration.

II. Route Mapping and Geography

The smuggling route has been mapped using satellite imagery, ground reconnaissance, and cross-border data from Burkina Faso’s security services. The primary ingress points include:

• Paga–Dakola Axis: A well-known trade junction with lax cargo checks due to economic reliance on cross-border commerce.

• Zebilla–Bawku–Pulmakom Corridor: An ethnically sensitive zone already destabilized by chieftaincy and ethnic clashes. Smugglers exploit the chaos to conceal weapon transfers.

• Bunkpurugu–Nakpanduri–Chereponi Belt: Sparsely policed, hilly terrain frequently used by nomads and small traders.

These corridors link into internal transit paths toward Tamale and potentially the Techiman–Kumasi–Accra belt.

Caption: Suspected cross-border jihadist route from eastern Burkina Faso into Ghana’s Upper East Region.

III. Types of Smuggled Items

Security forces have intercepted the following items during routine and intelligence-led operations:

• Light Weapons: AK-47s, RPG-7 launchers, G3 rifles, and PKM machine guns

• Motorcycles: Especially Chinese models, altered for off-road terrain

• Cash and Gold Dust: Often concealed in foodstuffs or spare parts, originating from illicit mines in Burkina Faso

• Fuel: Transported in jerry cans for remote logistics bases

• Propaganda Materials: Arabic-language Qur’ans, sermons from jihadist ideologues, portable radios

• Mobile Devices: Phones with jihadist numbers pre-saved, and memory cards with encrypted content

Caption: Weapons believed to be linked to Sahel insurgents, intercepted during Upper East operation (2024).

IV. Jihadist Linkages

Field intelligence and biometric records link the route to:

• ISIS-Greater Sahara (ISGS): Has established supply arms depots around Fada N’Gourma, using Ghana as a logistical extension.

• Ansarul Islam: Regrouping in dispersed cells since setbacks in Djibo and Arbinda, now seeking southern safe zones.

• JNIM-Katibat Macina: Expanding operations in southeast Burkina Faso; maintains ties with extremist clerics near Bittou.

Their motivations:

• Strategic Depth: Use Ghana for fallback positions and restocking

• Recruitment Grounds: Target Ghanaian youth disillusioned by poverty or tribal discrimination

• Revenue Routes: Taxing smugglers and illegal artisanal mining activities

V. Infiltration Tactics

Militants are increasingly relying on social engineering and environmental familiarity to breach Ghanaian borders:

• Kinship and Language: Use of shared Fulfulde and Hausa dialects to avoid suspicion

• Cover Roles: NGO workers, livestock herders, fruit traders

• Identity Forgery: ECOWAS passports with fake endorsements; impersonation of displaced persons

• Night Operations: Avoiding checkpoints using torchlights and local guides

VI. Border Intelligence Failures and Gaps

Critical vulnerabilities identified include:

• Technology Deficit: Many outposts lack thermal cameras or drones

• Sparse Patrols: Insufficient vehicle patrols at night or along footpaths

• Data Fragmentation: Border agencies often operate on isolated systems with no real-time information sharing

VII. Local Collaboration and Corruption Indicators

Key revelations from detainees and community monitors:

• Border Bribes: Payments ranging from GHC 100 to GHC 1,000 depending on cargo

• Intimidation of Chiefs: Militants threaten traditional authorities to gain passage

• Weapon Stockpiling in Villages: Guns hidden in granaries or animal pens

VIII. Case Studies (2023–2025)

Case 1: Zebilla Arrest (May 2023)

Security intercepted three Burkinabè nationals with loaded rifles and USBs containing radical sermons. Intelligence traced them to a safehouse in Dori.

Case 2: Bawku Weapons Trail (October 2024)

During post-conflict mop-up, rifles matching Burkina Faso serial batches were seized. Shell casings matched those used in prior Djibo raids.

Case 3: Nakpanduri Drone Sighting (February 2025)

Thermal drone patrol detected five motorcycles in convoy formation, bypassing checkpoints. One was later found abandoned near Walewale, its fuel tank hollowed to conceal cash.

IX. Satellite and Drone Surveillance Findings

Caption: Satellite snapshot revealing unpatrolled footpaths used by militant traffickers near the Ghana-Burkina Faso border.

Geospatial analysis indicates:

• Tree-Lined Routes: Footpaths hidden by vegetation canopy

• Dry Creek Beds: Used as natural highways for motorcycles

• Safe Dwellings: Temporary compounds that act as rest points

X. Impact on Northern Ghana Security

The corridor’s emergence has exacerbated local insecurity:

• Inter-ethnic Clashes: Weapons used in land disputes and chieftaincy violence

• Youth Disappearances: Missing persons reports up 17% in Upper East (2024)

• Kidnapping: Incidents linked to ransom-funded jihadist cells

• Fear Migration: Families fleeing villages along known corridors

XI. Ethnic Dynamics and Recruitment Risks

Fulani, Mamprusi, and Hausa youth are increasingly radicalized due to:

• Stigmatization: Profiling by security forces breeds resentment

• Religious Isolation: Radical preachers filling voids in underserved communities

• Economic Desperation: Jihadists offer stipends, food, and ideological identity

XII. Regional Implications

If Ghana’s border remains porous:

• Togo and Benin risk westward infiltration

• Tamale, Techiman, Kumasi may become targets for sleeper cells

• Côte d’Ivoire could see reactivation of its northern jihadist fronts

XIII. Government Response and Operations

• Operation Koudanlgou III: Stalled due to political tensions with Burkina Faso’s junta

• GAF Border Light Program: Active in Upper West, but inadequate in the East

• National Border Intelligence Taskforce: No deployment beyond Bolgatanga HQ

XIV. Recommendations for Ghana’s National Security

• Deploy Long-Endurance Drones: With night-vision payloads and ISR capability

• HUMINT Development: Embed trained informants among herder communities

• Community Trust Teams: Rebuild ties with Fulani youth and elders

• Joint Patrol Resumption: With Togo and Burkina Faso security forces

XV. Early Warning Indicators

Flag the following:

• Sudden influx of unfamiliar traders

• Missing local youth ages 13–25

• Public preaching by unknown imams

• Weapons-related injuries in health clinics

XVI. Risk Forecast: Q3–Q4 2025

• Increase in cross-border raids and arms seizures

• Spread of militant logistics nodes into Upper West, Northern Region

• Online propaganda targeting Ghanaian youth

• Risk of IED deployment on rural roads near Garu, Binduri

XVII. Policy Recommendations for Regional Partners

• Bolgatanga Intelligence Hub: ECOWAS-endorsed cross-border center

• Revive ECOWARN Monitoring: Daily reports from security posts

• Joint Command Exercises: Field training every 3 months

• Community Watch Networks: Incorporate hunters and vigilantes

The corridor is more than a route—it is a calculated geopolitical breach. Militants displaced by northern operations are not retreating—they are regrouping in the south. Ghana must now lead in countering this southern spillover before it becomes entrenched. A reactive posture is no longer viable. Intelligence dominance, regional coordination, and community inclusion must now form the backbone of Ghana’s counter-jihadist strategy.