Nigeria’s Middle Belt Faces Renewed Bandit Insurgency

Nigeria’s Middle Belt, a vital cultural and agricultural region straddling the country’s north and south, is grappling with a renewed and deeply entrenched bandit insurgency. Between 2023 and 2025, the region has witnessed a sharp increase in coordinated village raids, mass kidnappings, targeted killings, and cross-border arms trafficking. This report—designed for security professionals, policymakers, and development partners—presents a comprehensive analysis of the crisis, its structural enablers, and its growing national and regional implications.

Key findings include:

• A 37% rise in bandit attacks across Middle Belt states from Q1 2023 to Q1 2025 (ACLED, SB Morgen).
• Emerging hybrid alliances between ethnic militias, criminal cartels, and jihadist actors, particularly in Kaduna and Niger States.
• Widening arms trafficking corridors, particularly via Zamfara, Katsina, and Niger’s porous borders with Benin and Niger Republic.
• Failure of state interventions, including Operation Whirl Stroke and various regional vigilante collaborations, to sustainably curb violence.
• High civilian toll, with over 750,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs), dozens of razed villages, and chronic trauma within affected populations.

The report ends with a policy blueprint aimed at disrupting the insurgency’s logistics, enhancing regional security collaboration, restoring civil-military trust, and investing in early warning systems and peace-building structures.

“The Middle Belt is bleeding, not from a single wound—but from a network of insurgent incursions, ethnic manipulations, and government lapses. If we continue to normalize this crisis, the region will not only collapse inward but ignite outward instability across Nigeria’s fragile north-south divide.”
— Emmanuel Kotin, Executive Director, ACCT

1. INTRODUCTION TO THE MIDDLE BELT CRISIS

The Middle Belt of Nigeria—geographically sandwiched between the predominantly Muslim North and largely Christian South—is not merely a transitional zone but a highly diverse and historically contested region. Home to hundreds of ethnic communities including the Tiv, Berom, Jukun, Igala, and Idoma, among others, the Middle Belt has long been plagued by tensions fueled by a volatile mix of identity, land ownership, and political representation.

Historically, colonial-era boundary demarcations under British indirect rule created artificial divisions and hierarchies. Colonial administrators favored certain ethnic groups over others for local chieftaincies and tax collection roles, sowing early seeds of resentment. Post-independence migration patterns, especially of Hausa-Fulani Muslim settlers into indigenous Christian farming areas, intensified the perception of encroachment and marginalization. This “settler-indigene” dichotomy has persisted, often codified in state policies and political appointments.

The religious fault line—amplified by the rise of Pentecostal Christianity and conservative Islam—has further polarized communities. Periodic outbreaks of violence in Plateau, Benue, and Nasarawa states over the past two decades were frequently ignited by disputes over land use, grazing rights, and political control. The transformation of these tensions into organized violence involving heavily armed groups is a recent phenomenon, now exacerbated by state fragility, unemployment, weak justice systems, and proliferation of arms.

Today’s crisis is not simply a product of tribal antagonism—it is a confluence of unresolved historical grievances, environmental stressors, criminal opportunism, and strategic manipulation by political actors who have weaponized ethnicity for electoral gain. The Middle Belt has become both a battlefield and a bargaining chip in Nigeria’s wider national dysfunction.

2. RISE OF BANDIT INSURGENCY (2023–2025)

The renewed wave of banditry in Nigeria’s Middle Belt did not emerge in isolation—it is the latest chapter in an evolving crisis that intensified post-2023 general elections. The period following the elections saw an upsurge in political tension and localized disputes over electoral outcomes in key states like Benue, Plateau, and Niger. As federal security forces shifted focus to urban protest management, rural and peri-urban zones became vulnerable to opportunistic armed incursions.

Between March and July 2023, the Middle Belt witnessed over 220 recorded bandit incidents according to ACLED data. These included coordinated attacks on farming villages, highway kidnappings along the Abuja–Kaduna road, and arson in markets and churches. The Nigerian police and military launched multiple ad hoc operations, including Operation Forest Sweep in Nasarawa and Operation Safe Haven in Plateau. However, these efforts yielded temporary suppression with little sustainable containment.

By late 2023, intelligence indicated a growing operational merger between Fulani pastoralist militias—originally organized for communal defense—and criminal gangs engaged in cattle rustling and arms trafficking. These hybrid groups began to adopt guerrilla-style tactics, exploiting ungoverned forest zones such as Kamuku, Donga, and Alawa for staging raids. Ransoms became more organized, with bank accounts traced to syndicates in Zamfara and Niger.

In 2024, the insurgency evolved further. Militants began attacking security outposts and police stations, signaling a shift from economic crimes to anti-state actions. Fulani militias in Taraba and Nasarawa allegedly received ideological backing and light weaponry from extremist-linked cells in Northwestern Nigeria. The infamous Yellow Jaga and Ali Kawaje factions expanded their reach, penetrating deeper into Kogi and southern Kaduna.

By Q1 2025, attacks had become more lethal and strategic. Schoolchildren, clergy, and community leaders were increasingly targeted to break local morale. The deployment of sophisticated rifles, use of encrypted messaging apps, and reports of drone sightings point to growing technical capabilities. Analysts now fear that without urgent regional cooperation and counter-radicalization efforts, the banditry crisis may spiral into a full-scale insurgency with links to Sahelian jihadist movements.

3. GEOGRAPHICAL HOTSPOTS

• Benue: Attacks on farming communities; clashes with Tiv militias.
• Plateau: Jos South, Bokkos, and Riyom under siege.
• Kaduna: Birnin Gwari, Southern Kaduna – hybrid jihadist-bandit activity.
• Nasarawa & Taraba: Fulani-Tiv territorial disputes; forest hideouts.
• Kogi: Emerging threats along Lokoja–Okene axis.
• Niger State: Armed incursions into Shiroro, Rafi, and Munya LGAs.

4. WEAPONS SUPPLY CHAINS AND ARMS TRAFFICKING ROUTES

• Use of smuggling networks via Niger Republic and Benin.
• Weapons sourced from Libya’s black market.
• Intercepted convoys show increasing presence of assault rifles, IED materials.
• Arms-for-gold exchange noted in Zamfara and Niger states.

5. PROFILES OF ARMED GROUPS

• Key factions: Ali Kawaje Gang, Yellow Jaga Network, Fulani self-defense groups.
• Alliances with extremist groups: ISWAP involvement suspected in Kaduna corridor.
• Operational bases: Forests in Kamuku, Kachia, Donga, and Alawa.

6. PATTERNS OF ATTACK

• Types: Mass abductions, cattle rustling, arson, ambushes.
• Target profiles: Schools, churches, market convoys.
• Seasonal trends: Dry season peaks, post-harvest targeting.

7. CROSS-BORDER DIMENSIONS

• Mobility of fighters across Niger, Cameroon, and Benin.
• Influence of Sahelian insurgent ideologies.
• Collaboration with Tuareg and Hausa criminal logistics.

8. HUMANITARIAN FALLOUT

• Over 750,000 IDPs across Plateau, Benue, Kaduna.
• Massive school closures, food insecurity, and PTSD among survivors.
• NGO access hindered by security threats.

9. FAILURES AND GAPS IN STATE RESPONSE

• Lack of consistent funding for regional joint security task forces.
• Distrust between military and communities.
• Ineffective integration of vigilante groups and civilian JTFs.

10. ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY AND SURVEILLANCE

• Underutilized drone surveillance potential.
• Poor early warning system coordination.
• Community-based alert platforms under-resourced.

11. LOCAL RESISTANCE AND COMMUNITY RESILIENCE

• Civilian intelligence networks.
• Women-led peace committees in Plateau.
• Faith-based trauma healing initiatives.

12. REGIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS

• Threat to Abuja’s security corridor.
• Increased rural-urban displacement pressure.
• Possible linkages to Sahel terrorist networks.

13. FORECAST: LATE 2025 AND BEYOND

• Potential spread into North Central and Southern states.
• Predicted spike in attacks ahead of 2026 local elections.
• Calls for reactivation of dormant ECOWAS standby mechanisms.

14. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

• Establishment of inter-state intelligence fusion centers.
• Fast-track border surveillance cooperation with Niger and Benin.
• Strategic disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) for non-ideological bandits.
• Scale-up humanitarian corridor protection.

15. CONCLUSION

The Middle Belt’s crisis is no longer a slow burn—it is an active threat to Nigeria’s cohesion. Without decisive, integrated, and people-centered solutions, the insurgency could undermine democratic stability and accelerate regional insecurity. ACCT calls for urgent regional synergy, security sector reform, and deep community engagement.