Between 2022 and 2025, a series of increasingly credible reports, intelligence intercepts, and confirmed field operations indicate the emergence of a complex and dangerous collaboration between Ambazonian separatist militias operating in Cameroon’s Anglophone Northwest and Southwest regions and Boko Haram factions—specifically those affiliated with Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP)—active in the Far North. This evolving alliance has manifested in joint operations, logistical coordination, arms exchanges, and the establishment of parallel resource-sharing and intelligence structures.
While historically separate in both objectives and operational theaters, these groups now appear to be converging around a shared anti-state agenda and complementary tactical capabilities. The alliance is driven by mutual benefit: Boko Haram offers access to arms and broader jihadist networks, while Ambazonian fighters contribute detailed local knowledge of borderland terrain and smuggling corridors. Analysis of attacks in Mayo-Sava, Logone-et-Chari, and Mayo-Tsanaga departments, as well as intercepted communications and arms recoveries, confirms an escalation in coordinated militant activity. This convergence—unregulated, hybrid, and cross-border—poses a growing threat not just to Cameroon but to the wider Lake Chad Basin and Central African region.
“What we are seeing is a hybrid insurgency — two distinct groups, united by shared chaos. This alliance, if left unchecked, may become the most dangerous cross-border terror threat in Central and West Africa.” — Emmanuel Kotin, Executive Director, Africa Center for Counter Terrorism
Cameroon’s Dual Conflict Zones
Cameroon faces two parallel yet increasingly interconnected insurgencies:
- Ambazonian Separatism: The Anglophone crisis escalated into full-blown armed conflict in 2017 after protests over systemic marginalization. Rebel factions such as the Ambazonia Defence Forces (ADF), Southern Cameroons Defence Forces (SOCADEF), and other splinter groups launched guerilla campaigns targeting state infrastructure and military outposts. Though originally confined to the Southwest and Northwest regions, the conflict has expanded through covert alliances, smuggling corridors, and diaspora-backed funding networks.
- Boko Haram/ISWAP Insurgency: Since 2014, Boko Haram and its ISWAP offshoot have entrenched themselves in Cameroon’s Far North, launching attacks across Mayo-Sava, Mayo-Tsanaga, and Logone-et-Chari. These areas border Nigeria’s Borno and Adamawa states and are part of a broader insurgency footprint that spans the Lake Chad Basin. The collapse of local governance, corruption, and limited border control have created fertile ground for terrorist expansion.
II. Timeline of Key Events (2022–2025)
- April 2022: Audio leak surfaces of a senior ADF commander praising Boko Haram’s “resistance to foreign-imposed governance.”
- September 2023: Gendarmerie post near Mora attacked by insurgents using Boko Haram-style IEDs; survivors report Ambazonian accents and insignia among the attackers.
- January 2024: Arms cache discovered in Muyuka includes Boko Haram-standard RPGs, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and ISWAP tactical manuals.
- May 2025: Nigerian forces intercept a convoy at the Banki border crossing carrying Ambazonian fighters en route to an alleged coordination meeting with ISWAP units.
III. Operational Zones of Convergence
Key areas of overlap and militant activity include:
- Mayo-Sava: Hotbed of insurgent raids, especially in Kolofata and Mora.
- Logone-et-Chari: Nexus of arms smuggling and cross-border movement from Lake Chad.
- Mayo-Tsanaga: Reports of insurgent safe houses and training grounds.
- Northwest transit towns: Nkambe, Wum, and Kumbo serving as staging points.
These zones provide access to forest cover, rural populations, minimal surveillance, and escape routes into Nigeria or the Central African Republic.
IV. Motivations Behind the Alliance
- Ideological Convergence: Both factions oppose the Yaoundé-based central government and frame their struggle as a fight against state oppression.
- Tactical Synergy: Ambazonian fighters contribute topographical and local movement intelligence, while Boko Haram/ISWAP brings experience in bomb-making, attack coordination, and access to regional jihadist networks.
- Arms Exchange: Boko Haram/ISWAP supplies more sophisticated weaponry to Ambazonian fighters in return for logistical support.
- Mutual Profitability: Joint operations allow for shared ransom revenues, better looting outcomes, and broader target portfolios.
V. Joint Tactical Patterns
- Cross-Training Initiatives: Phone videos from captured militants show Boko Haram cadres teaching bomb assembly and guerilla ambush tactics to Ambazonian fighters.
- Safe Haven Coordination: The forests along the Ring Road and Mandara Mountains are used as shared hiding spots and regrouping areas.
- Two-Phase Raids: Documented attacks show Ambazonian-led strikes on security outposts followed by Boko Haram-led ambushes of medical or humanitarian response convoys.
VI. Communication Channels
The following secure communication tools and relay methods are in use:
- Encrypted Messaging: Telegram, Signal, and Zello for strategic planning.
- Couriers: Local traders and transhumant herders transport SIM cards, handwritten notes, and memory sticks across checkpoints.
- Embedded Informants: Market vendors and taxi drivers in towns like Maroua, Garoua, and Bamenda pass information between networks.
VII. Weapons Trade and Logistics
- IED Components: Ambazonian-controlled smuggling routes channel wires, fertilizer, and scrap metals into Boko Haram zones.
- Firearms: Boko Haram is known to distribute RPGs, M16s, and Chinese Type-56 rifles to separatist cells.
- Vehicle Modification Centers: Covert workshops near Ndop and Mokolo have been linked to technical vehicle conversion for raids.
VIII. Financing and Resource Networks
- Kidnapping for Ransom: Collaborations are increasingly transnational, with hostages moved between camps controlled by either group.
- Informal Taxation: Traders and herders are forced to pay tolls at checkpoints jointly manned by militants.
- Crypto and NGO Diversion: Diaspora donations are funneled through pseudo-charitable fronts, with recent upticks in anonymous Bitcoin transfers traced to South Africa, Germany, and Nigeria.
IX. Profiles of Key Commanders
- General Black Mamba (ADF): Ambazonian commander reputed to have operational links with ISWAP since late 2022; known for brutal tactics.
- Abu Khalid (ISWAP): Nigerian-born leader of cross-border cells; suspected to coordinate Far North raids in tandem with separatist units.
- Colonel Five Stars: A shadowy figure believed to operate as the key conduit between Ambazonian separatists and Boko Haram logistics officers.
X. Impacts on Civilians
- Over 35,000 civilians displaced from Kolofata and Mora alone in 2024
- Dozens of schools shuttered due to fear of attacks or occupation
- Targeted ethnic violence against Hausa traders, Fulani nomads, and Bakweri farming communities
XI. Cross-Border Implications
- Borno and Adamawa States (Nigeria): Militants cross borders disguised as IDPs or traders, fueling instability.
- Chad and CAR: Ambazonian fighters reportedly use informal crossings to escape military pressure or link up with CAR-based mercenaries.
XII. Evidence of Intelligence Failures
- Routine ambushes on known patrol paths unanticipated by military planners
- Intercepted calls and texts often left unanalyzed due to bandwidth and translation issues
- Disconnected ransom reports: Multiple hostage negotiation patterns not cross-referenced across regions
XIII. Security Force Response (2023–2025)
- Operation Emergence VI launched mid-2023 to clear known insurgent bases
- Increased air reconnaissance using drones over Mayo-Sava
- Joint raids with Nigerian forces around Gwoza and Limani yielded mixed results
XIV. MNJTF Involvement
- Lake Chad patrols expanded but failed to significantly disrupt infiltration routes
- Lack of integrated intelligence-sharing protocols hinders joint planning
- Drone support limited to reconnaissance with poor response integration on the ground
XV. Case Studies
Case Study 1: Mora Ambush (Feb 2024)
A Gendarmerie patrol convoy was ambushed near Mora by militants later confirmed to be a mix of Boko Haram and Ambazonian fighters. Weapon analysis and voice intercepts indicated joint planning.
Case Study 2: Crypto Ransom Trail (Aug 2025)
A kidnapped aid worker’s ransom was paid in Bitcoin. The transaction path led to a dark web wallet previously associated with ISWAP funding channels. Communications were traced to an Ambazonian-linked handler.
XVI. Forecasting Future Risks (Q3 2025–2026)
- Formal unification of factions under a shared insurgency brand
- Spillover into Centre and Adamawa Regions with increased operational sophistication
- Integration of drone warfare and misinformation for psychological and battlefield advantage
XVII. Strategic Recommendations
- Create joint rapid-reaction CT units specialized in hybrid insurgency containment
- Deploy regional SIGINT platforms capable of intercepting encrypted communications
- Expand deradicalization efforts with tailored messaging for border communities
- Build regional fusion centers to share HUMINT and digital threat assessments
- Partner with social media and fintech platforms to flag insurgent communications and transactions
The hybridization of insurgency in Cameroon’s Far North signals a dangerous shift from localized rebellion to regional militant convergence. As Ambazonian separatists and Boko Haram factions adapt to one another’s methods and forge tactical alliances, the region faces a multiplying threat with implications for regional security, humanitarian stability, and international counterterrorism efforts. Coordinated, forward-looking intelligence action is imperative to prevent a new epicenter of cross-border terrorism from solidifying.
