G5 Sahel Troop Drawdown: Security Vacuum Alert

The disbandment and drawdown of the G5 Sahel Joint Force between 2022 and 2025 have triggered a seismic shift in West Africa’s regional security architecture. Originally established to combat jihadist insurgencies, transnational crime, and illicit trafficking across one of the world’s most volatile regions, the G5’s dismantling has ushered in a dangerous vacuum.

Key Findings:

• Militant expansion: ISGS, JNIM, Boko Haram factions, and unaffiliated armed groups are rapidly consolidating gains across the tri-border zones.
• Civilian casualties: Over 5,000 civilian deaths recorded across Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger since 2022 due to extremist violence and retaliatory operations.
• Humanitarian disaster: More than 2.7 million people are displaced, with a growing dependency on fragile aid corridors increasingly under threat.
• State fragmentation: Regime changes and military juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have undermined regional cooperation.
• Intelligence blackout: Withdrawal of French forces (Operation Barkhane), the winding down of MINUSMA, and fractured intel-sharing have blinded surveillance capacities.

“The G5 Sahel troop withdrawal has left more than a military gap — it has opened a regional abyss. Without a unified counter-insurgency structure, extremist groups are seizing geography, legitimacy, and lives with dangerous ease.”
— Emmanuel Kotin, Executive Director, Africa Center for Counter Terrorism

G5 Sahel Force

The G5 Sahel Joint Force (FC-G5S) was officially launched in 2017 by five countries: Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. It emerged in response to the increasing penetration of jihadist groups and organized criminal networks across their porous borders.

• Mandate: Counter-terrorism, border security, anti-trafficking operations, and supporting humanitarian missions.
• Headquarters: Sévaré, Mali.
• Initial Troop Strength: Estimated 5,000 troops.
• Primary Partners: France (via Operation Barkhane), EU, UN, AU, and regional bodies.
• Operational Zones: Focused largely on the “Liptako-Gourma” tri-border area (Mali-Niger-Burkina Faso).

Chronology of the Drawdown (2022–2025)

• May 2022: Mali formally announces withdrawal from the G5 Sahel, citing “instrumentalization” by foreign powers.
• Sept 2022: Burkina Faso experiences second coup in eight months, heightening internal security focus.
• July 2023: Niger experiences a coup, followed by souring ties with France and regional neighbors.
• Early 2024: Joint patrols drastically reduce; cross-border coordination breaks down.
• Q2 2025: G5 Sahel operations are considered defunct, with only Chad and Mauritania attempting minimal coordination.

Internal Political Drivers

• Coups & Regime Changes: Military juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger shifted national focus to domestic power consolidation.
• Sovereignty Sentiment: Anti-French rhetoric and calls for self-determined security led to the expulsion of foreign troops and advisers.
• Operational Fatigue: Prolonged, under-resourced missions and mounting casualties led to troop demoralization.

Territorial Loss and Militant Gains

Extremist groups have filled the void:

• ISGS (Islamic State in the Greater Sahara): Has expanded into abandoned G5 zones in eastern Mali and western Niger.
• JNIM (Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin): Consolidating influence across central Mali and northern Burkina Faso.
• Boko Haram & ISWAP: Exploiting weakened regional cooperation around Lake Chad.
• Local insurgents: Armed bandits and ethnic militias now operate openly in rural areas once patrolled by G5 troops.

Unsecured Borderlands

Hotspots:

• Mali-Niger-Burkina Faso Tri-border Region: Surge in IED attacks, ambushes, and mass killings.
• Lake Chad Basin: Boko Haram and ISWAP are using the gap to re-establish lost territories.
• Niger-Benin-Togo corridor: Increasing attacks on border posts and civilian travelers.

(Map: Pre and Post-G5 Security Zones – Tri-border Focus)

Civilian Impact and Humanitarian Fallout

• Displacement: Over 2.7 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the Sahel as of mid-2025 (UNHCR).
• Atrocities: Documented cases of massacres in Djibo, Arbinda, and Menaka.
• Humanitarian Access: Aid workers face targeted kidnappings; supply corridors increasingly cut off.

(Photos: Displaced families in Burkina Faso camps; destroyed village in central Mali)

Case Studies

1. Arbinda Massacre (2023): Over 140 civilians killed after local defense groups were overwhelmed following G5 withdrawal.
2. Menaka Infiltration (2024): ISGS seized control of entire communes within days of Niger’s G5 patrol drawdown.
3. Inata Base Raid (2022): Militant assault post-G5 troop reduction left over 50 gendarmes dead.

Responses from Regional Forces and Local Militias

• Dozo Hunters & Koglweogo (Burkina Faso): Mobilized in rural areas but often accused of human rights abuses.
• ECOWAS: Political condemnation but limited military coordination due to regime legitimacy disputes.
• Niger’s National Guard: Reinforced border towns with limited tactical capacity.

MINUSMA and France’s Reduced Footprint

• MINUSMA (UN Mission in Mali): Scheduled full exit by end of 2025.
• Operation Barkhane: Officially ended in 2022; sporadic French presence remains in Chad.
• Impact: Intelligence loss, lack of aerial support, and vacuum in air surveillance.

Smuggling Routes and Transnational Crime

• Weapons Trafficking: Gaddafi-era arms flowing unchecked into the Sahel.
• Human Trafficking: Agadez and Gao becoming key smuggling hubs again.
• Drug Corridors: Cocaine and methamphetamine routed through Mali into Algeria and Europe.

Cross-Border Spillovers

• Benin & Togo: Attacks in northern departments; schools closed; military posts ambushed.
• Ghana: Increasing military deployments near Bawku and Upper East border towns.
• Ivory Coast: Counter-insurgency drills intensified in northern regions.

Technology and Intelligence Gaps

• Drone Surveillance Collapse: Majority of drone bases operated by France and EU shuttered.
• Satellite Monitoring: Regional reliance on outdated or outsourced intelligence.
• Lack of Interoperability: No real-time data-sharing between Sahel states post-G5.

Forecasting Future Threat Clusters

• 2025 Q4 – 2026:
  • Northern Mali: Likely JNIM stronghold.
  • Southwest Niger: Key ISGS recruitment zone.
  • Eastern Burkina Faso: Massacres and displacement expected to spike.
  • Coastal West Africa: Emerging jihadist infiltration.

Policy Recommendations

For AU and ECOWAS:

• Establish rapid-response regional force.
• Strengthen intelligence-sharing protocols.
• Engage in pragmatic diplomacy with Sahel regimes.

For G5 States:

• Rebuild regional security frameworks under new terms.
• Increase investment in local police and civil defense.
• Vet and regulate local militias to reduce abuses.

For Global Partners:

• Support drone and satellite surveillance resumption.
• Fund community-based resilience programs.
• Prioritize youth de-radicalization and economic alternatives.

Strategic Warning Box

Urgent Alerts:

• Aid Workers: Avoid rural axes in eastern Burkina Faso.
• Investors: Heightened kidnapping risk along Niger-Nigeria trade routes.
• NGOs: Coordinate with ECOWAS and local authorities before deploying.

The collapse of the G5 Sahel Force underscores the dangers of fragmented counter-terrorism approaches in regions plagued by transnational insurgencies. The rapid territorial gains by jihadist groups and the unraveling of once-coordinated military efforts call for a bold reimagining of African-led security architecture. Regional cooperation, technological reintegration, and civilian-centric responses must define the next chapter. The cost of inaction will be measured in lives, lost nations, and prolonged instability.