The already volatile tri-border region between Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger is descending into deeper chaos as two rival jihadist groups—Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS)—engage in an intensifying turf war. Fierce clashes have erupted in Ménaka (Mali), Oudalan (Burkina Faso), and Tillabéri (Niger), leading to over 300 civilian deaths, mass displacement, and the collapse of already fragile local governance.
As both groups compete for ideological dominance, recruitment, and control over trafficking routes, local communities are caught in a deadly crossfire, while national forces and international partners remain overstretched or absent.
Crisis Zones: The Flashpoints of Conflict
Key Areas of Fighting:
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Ménaka (Mali): ISGS fighters overran villages near Anderamboukane, killing at least 40 people in a single raid.
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Oudalan Province (Burkina Faso): JNIM elements ambushed ISGS patrols using IEDs and hit-and-run tactics.
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Tillabéri (Niger): Armed confrontations between the two groups left dozens dead, including suspected child soldiers.
“The attacks are becoming more sophisticated and less predictable—civilians are no longer just collateral; they’re being targeted for refusing to support either group.”
— Local humanitarian worker, Dori, Burkina Faso
Why the Jihadist Infighting Matters
The JNIM-ISGS rivalry is not new, but its scale and intensity have escalated dramatically in 2025. Both groups—despite sharing Salafi-jihadist ideologies—differ in their affiliation, strategy, and tactical goals:
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JNIM is Al-Qaeda-affiliated, focused on embedding within communities, negotiating with locals, and controlling territory via influence and taxes (zakat).
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ISGS, aligned with the Islamic State, employs more brutal tactics—massacres, forced recruitment, and attacks on civilians who resist.
This ideological divergence is now playing out in a bloody power struggle, fueled by access to arms, abandoned state facilities, and illicit revenue from gold smuggling and arms trafficking.
Humanitarian Fallout and Governance Collapse
According to the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and ACLED (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project):
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Estimated Civilian Deaths (Q1 2025): 325
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Displaced Persons: Over 100,000 across the tri-border zone
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Schools Closed: 430 (UNESCO data)
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Markets/Bazaars Burned: At least 67
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Local Mayors and Chiefs Fleeing: Confirmed in 15 towns
Efforts by humanitarian agencies are hampered by road ambushes, looted aid convoys, and bureaucratic restrictions from transitional military regimes in Mali and Burkina Faso.
Tactical Analysis: What Both Groups Are Fighting For
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Cross-border movement freedom for arms and fighters
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Control over illegal gold mines and smuggling corridors
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Recruitment bases among impoverished, ungoverned youth populations
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Narrative dominance—each group claiming to represent the “true caliphate”
According to ACCT’s threat intelligence unit, both groups have now escalated propaganda warfare, using Telegram and WhatsApp channels to broadcast battlefield “victories,” execute defectors, and issue threats to civilians.
Response from Regional Governments and International Partners
National Responses:
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Burkina Faso: Military junta deploys elite units to Oudalan, but trust with civilians remains broken.
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Mali: Wagner-aligned forces involved in limited operations in Gao and Ménaka but accused of abuses.
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Niger: Military intelligence warns of ISGS attempts to encircle major routes to Niamey.
International Response:
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France’s withdrawal from Mali has left a power vacuum.
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ECOWAS remains divided on security intervention strategies.
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U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) conducts surveillance but limited direct action.
Expert Commentary: Emmanuel Kotin, Executive Director, ACCT
“The Sahel is now witnessing the emergence of a ‘jihadist war within a war.’ The clash between JNIM and ISGS is not a sign of collapse—it’s a recalibration of terror tactics that only increases civilian suffering.”
“The tri-border zone has become the most dangerous ungoverned space in the world. No amount of isolated military offensives can substitute for a unified African security doctrine. We need intelligence fusion centers, cross-border command agreements, and civilian-led counter-radicalization programs, or this fire will burn into West Africa’s core.”
Policy Recommendations from ACCT
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Establish a Sahel Counter-Terrorism Fusion Task Force (SCT-FTF) for cross-border intelligence operations.
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Invest in drone and satellite monitoring of key jihadist routes and mining corridors.
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Integrate local conflict mediators into security dialogue—especially Tuareg and Fulani community leaders.
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Disrupt terror financing by targeting illegal mining and arms trade nodes.
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Pressure global tech firms to restrict jihadist digital platforms.
Conclusion: Sahel as the New Epicenter of Global Jihadist Rivalry
The ongoing conflict in the tri-border region between JNIM and ISGS represents more than factional infighting—it signals a geostrategic shift in global jihadism, where Africa is no longer a periphery, but a primary front.
The Africa Center for Counter Terrorism (ACCT) calls for urgent collective action, not just to end violence—but to prevent the entrenchment of terrorism as a normalized way of life for the next generation in the Sahel.
